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Abstract
This paper studies the effect of forward contracts on the stability of
collusion among firms, competing in supply functions on the spot market.
A forward market can increase the range of discount factors which allow to
sustain collusion. On the contrary, collusion is destabilised when a potential
deviator sells a significant amount forward. Results do not depend on the
type (financial or physical) of contract fulfilment and are robust to different
levels of demand uncertainty. As a policy implication, the study finds that
liquid and anonymous forward markets are incompatible with collusion.
1 Introduction
Many commodities are forward traded such that the time of contract closure signif-
icantly pre-dates the time of delivery. Forward trading allows producers to hedge
price risk by locking in future revenues well ahead of actual production. However,
by selling forward, firms not only hedge risk, but also change their strategic posi-
tion in the subsequent spot market as pointed out by Allaz and Vila (1993) in the
case of Cournot oligopoly. The following analysis provides insights into the effect
of forward contracts on the stability of collusion when the spot market clears in
supply functions, a setting that is especially close, but not restricted, to electricity
wholesale markets.
∗This work benefited from comments of participants at EARIE annual conference Milan,
EAERE annual conference Helsinki, the Toulouse Conference on the Economics of Energy and
Climate Change, and the Cologne International Energy Summer School (CIES), particularly
from those of Richard Green and Matti Liski. I am moreover indebted to Frank Wolak, Vitali
Gretschko, and Yossi Spiegel for numerous helpful remarks, and to Katheline Schuber and Pierre
Fleckinger for their encouragement to address this topic in the first place. All remaining errors
are mine.
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I find that forward trading is either limited or ceases completely when collusion
has to be sustained, depending on the observability of firms’ forward positions.
This is due to the possibility of a deviating firm to boost its profits from deviation
through forward sales. The finding has important implications for competition
policy and transparency regulation: when the producers’ forward positions are not
observable, the existence of liquid and anonymous forward markets is incompatible
with the prevalence of collusion. However, the possibility of selling forward can
help sustain collusion if firms fear the pro-competitive effect of such forward sales
after the collapse of a collusive agreement.
The empirical relevance of my setting is demonstrated by Mercadal (2018),
who shows that the mark-ups in the US Midwest electricity market were too high
to be consistent with one-shot Nash-equilibrium behaviour. The author interprets
this finding as an evidence of tacit collusion. The excessive mark-ups disappear,
however, in response to a policy change that substantially increases the liquidity
in the financial forward market while leaving the physical market conditions un-
changed – a finding which is in line with the results of my paper. Further evidence
is provided by Sweeting (2007) who shows that two dominating producers in the
UK electricity market exerted substantial market power, leaving behind the pos-
sibility of increasing short run profits. The same UK power sector has served as a
major example for a market where firms compete in supply functions on a short
term market and can close forward contracts several months ahead (see e.g. Green,
1999). In fact, most electric power exchanges worldwide impose some kind of sup-
ply function bidding for spot sales, and allow for hedging of the price risk through
forward contracts. (See e.g. for the UK Green and Newbery (1992), Wolak (2003)
for California, Wolak (2007) for Australia, Hortac¸su and Puller (2008) for Texas, or
Fabra and Reguant (2014) for Spain.) Another empirical example where competi-
tion on the spot market is in price-quantity curves and with wide-ranging forward
hedging possibilities are various financial markets, such as the security auctions
of the Treasury or liquidity auctions held by central banks (see Vives, 2011, for
a discussion of these cases). A rigorous analytical discussion of the potential for
collusion in this setting is – however – missing.
The pro-competitive effect of forwards in Allaz and Vila’s model is due to re-
peated interactions of rival suppliers before the final clearing of the market. By
selling forward, a firm can lock in a fixed quantity for the upcoming spot market,
thereby achieving a sort of Stackelberg advantage over its competitor. The total
supply in the spot market is therefore larger with forward trading and the equilib-
rium price is lower. Given that both the firms are allowed to trade forward, they
both face the same incentive to expand their output by selling forward, although
they would be better off without. Mahenc and Salanie (2004) find an opposite re-
sult in their study of price competition in the spot market. By buying forward, the
producer commits to raise prices in the spot market. A similar result is obtained
by Ferreira (2003) for Cournot competition with infinitely many openings of the
forward market. Green (1999) and Newbery (1998) show that the pro-competitive
effect of forward sales found by Allaz and Vila (1993) carry over to the case of
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supply function bidding in the spot market. Brandts et al. (2008) show support-
ing evidence from laboratory experiments. Holmberg and Willems (2015) consider
supply functions and the strategic use of option contracts. None of these contribu-
tions however addresses the possibility of collusion. Ciarreta and Gutie´rrez-Hita
(2006) model collusion in supply functions, but do not consider forward contracts.
Liski and Montero (2006) in contrast study a repeated oligopoly game with
several openings of a forward and a spot market. They show that the possibility
of forward trading facilitates collusion in both, price and quantity competition
in the spot market. But, somewhat parallel to the dichotomy of Allaz and Vila
(1993), and Mahenc and Salanie (2004), the strategic effect of forward positions
differs fundamentally between the two cases. For a price-setting oligopoly, selling
forward locks in the corresponding quantities and thus reduces the size of the
market that could be captured by a deviating firm. This contrasts with competition
in quantities where a deviating firm can never capture the complete spot market
because other firms set their quantities in advance. So Liski and Montero (2006)
conclude that when spot market competition is in prices, the critical discount
factor for collusion decreases in the forward sales of the firms. However, when
firms compete in quantities, collusion is harder to sustain when firms have sold
forward.
From the fundamental work of Klemperer and Meyer (1989), it is well known
that a Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) lies between the theoretical Cournot
and Bertrand prices and quantities. One might therefore conjecture that the effect
of forward trading on collusion in supply functions will be somehow contained
between the results for price and quantity competition. But in light of the contrary
results for both the cases in the literature, there is no evident intuition about the
effect the forward positions ought to have.
The linear supply function equilibrium model allows to represent competition in
supply functions in a practical manner (Vives, 2011). The unique and analytically
solvable equilibria led to its widespread adoption in the literature. With respect
to forward trading, however, the linear model is known to exert a somewhat arti-
ficial strategic neutrality of forward contracts. Newbery (1998) and Green (1999)
therefore calibrate firms’ forward positions with conjectural variations. Holmberg
(2011) shows how endogenous forward positions emerge if the assumption of linear
supply functions is relaxed. This paper first follows Newbery (1998) and Green
(1999) in studying the effect of forward sales on collusion for the linear model. It
then discusses a generalisation in the line of Holmberg (2011) for non-linear supply
functions with endogenous forward contracting.
The outline for the rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the
model and derives spot market strategies for the one-shot game and for joint profit
maximisation. The repeated game with several forward and spot market openings
is studied in Section 3. Demand uncertainty and its effect on the sustainability
of collusion is addressed in Section 4. Section 5 shows the equivalence of financial
and physical settlement of forward contracts, discusses the impact of different
informational regimes, and the generalisation to non-linear supply functions in the
3
spot market. Section 6 is the conclusion.
2 The Static Game
2.1 The Model
Two firms i, j produce a homogeneous good at symmetric costs C(q) = c1qk+
c2
2
q2k,
c1, c2 > 0, with qk ∈ R+ denoting the quantities of firms k = i, j. They compete
in a spot market with supply functions qk(p) = αk + βkp, with αk, βk ∈ R, βk > 0,
k = i, j, where p ∈ R denotes the spot market price.1 Demand is given by
D(p) = A − bp + ε with A, b > 0. ε : Ω → R is a random variable defined
on a probability space Ω with a continuous distribution function that is common
knowledge to all market participants. ε has a zero mean, a finite second moment
σ2, and a lower bound ε > bc1 − A that ensures positive demand at a price equal
to the intercept of marginal costs.
Before bidding in the spot market, the firms can sell ‘contracts-for-difference’
(financial forwards), specifying that once the spot market clears, the seller of the
contract receives from the buyer the contracted quantity times the forward price
f , and pays to the buyer the contracted quantity times the realised spot price
p. The forward market follows the model of Allaz and Vila (1993): Both firms
simultaneously disclose the quantities xi, xj ≥ 0 they intend to sell forward.2
There are S ≥ 2 risk neutral, not liquidity constraint speculators who observe
the total amount of open interest xi + xj. Speculators simultaneously choose the
per-unit price fs ∈ R, s = 1, ..., S they are willing to pay for the offered contracts.
The complete game structure is as follows:
1. Firms i and j simultaneously choose the quantities xi, xj they intend to sell
in forward contracts. xi + xj becomes common knowledge.
2. Each speculator s = 1, 2, ..., S chooses the per-unit price fs ∈ R she in-
tends to pay for the offered forward quantities. The highest price bid f =
maxs=1,...,S {fs} wins all offered contracts. If there are N ≤ S identical high-
est price bids, each of these bids wins a quantity N−1(xi + xj) in forward
contracts.
3. Firms simultaneously choose their spot market supply functions qi(p), qj(p)
of the linear form qk(p) = αk + βkp, k = i, j.
4. The realisation of the demand shock ε is observed. The spot price p is
determined by solving the market clearing condition D(p) = qi(p) + qj(p).
Forward contracts are settled. Firms produce and sell quantities according
to their supply function at the market clearing price.
1Negative prices are allowed and are actually observed in a number of electricity spot markets
around the world.
2In line with Green (1999), I do not consider producers going long in the forward market, e.g.
buying forward their own output.
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The market clearing spot price in terms of demand and supply parameters is
p =
A+ ε− αi − αj
b+ βi + βj
(1)
The ex-post profit of every speculator with a winning price bid is N−1(xi+xj)(f−
p). The profit of all other speculators is zero. The ex-post realised profit of firm i
is
pii = (f − p)xi + pqi(p)− C (qi(p)) , (2)
The solution concept applied in the following is subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
2.2 Nash Strategies
The Spot Market
Following Klemperer and Meyer (1989), and more specifically Newbery (1998)
and Green (1999), we determine the price firm i would choose optimally for an
arbitrary realisation of the demand shock ε, and then derive the corresponding
supply function.
Express firm i’s profit in terms of its residual demand, using qi = D(p)− qj(p).
pii = (f − p)xi + p (D(p)− qj(p))− C (D(p)− qj(p))
The first order condition for an optimal price is
dpii
dp
= −xi +D(p)− qj(p) + (D′ − q′j) (p− C ′ (D(p)− qj(p))) = 0. (3)
Using D(p)− qj(p) = qi(p) = αi + βip we obtain
dpii
dp
= −xi + αi + βip− (b+ βj) (p− c1 − c2(αi + βip)) = 0. (4)
To be true for any possible price, the first order condition must hold as an identity,
implying that all factors multiplying p at the same power are equal. this yields
the following optimal supply function parameters.
β∗i =
b+ βj
1 + c2(b+ βj)
(5)
α∗i (xi, βi, βj) =
xi − c1(b+ βj)
1 + c2(b+ βj)
= β∗i
(
xi
b+ βj
− c1
)
(6)
Note that α∗i depends on the slope parameters β
∗
i , βj, and on the firm’s own forward
position xi. The slope parameter β
∗
i depends on the slope βj of the rival’s supply
function, but does not depend on either firms’ supply function intercept αi, αj, or
the forward positions xi, xj. So all strategic interactions between the rival firms
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occur through the slope parameters βi and βj. Use the expression in (5) to define
the best response function of firm i to the slope parameter of firm j as β∗i = BR(βj).
Due to symmetry of both firms, the best response function for j is equivalent, thus
BR(.) is not indexed by i or j. It can be solved for the unique positive Nash
equilibrium slope parameter which will be denoted by βn in the remainder of the
paper:
βn = BR(βn) > 0 (7)
The inverse of the supply function given by (5) and (6) is such that the price equals
marginal costs at the level of forward contracts. Larger quantities are sold above
marginal costs and smaller quantities below it. Figure 1 illustrates the Nash spot
market strategies with and without forward sales together with the joint profit
maximising supply function which will be discussed in Section 2.3.
xi
c1
Nash supply fct.
(no forwards)
Nash supply fct.
(financial forwards)
joint profit max. supply fct.
(no forwards)
marginal costs
C ′(xi)
spot market supply, output
price, cost
Figure 1: Joint profit maximisation and Nash spot market supply functions with
and without forward contracts.
The Forward Market
Speculators observe the total open interest (xi+xj), anticipate the optimal supply
functions of firms in the spot market, and submit their forward price bid fs based
on this expectation.3 The expected spot price p¯n obtains from Equation (1) with
ε = 0, where the subscript n indicates that one-shot Nash strategies are expected
in the spot market.
p¯n = E(pn) =
A− α∗i − α∗j
b+ β∗i + β
∗
j
(8)
3With βi = βj = βn, it is evident from (6) and (1) that xi + xj is a sufficient statistic to
predict the expected spot price.
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Any winning forward price bid fs < p¯n would imply negative expected profits for
the winning speculator, whereas any winning price bid fs > p¯n could be profitably
undercut by a rival speculator. The only pure strategy equilibrium outcome is
that the winning forward price bid equals the expected spot price, f = p¯n, given
xi and xj.
In the first stage, firms i and j choose their forward positions xi and xj, an-
ticipating the effect on the spot market outcome and the forward price f . The
expected profits of firms depend on the range of possible demand realisations.
Consider the profit of firm i for a specific realisation of ε as given in (2) and use
qi = αi + βip to rewrite pii in terms of powers of p.
pii = (fx− c1αi) + p
(
−x+ αi − c1αi − c2
2
α2i
)
+ p2
(
βi − c2
2
β2i
)
(9)
The ex-ante expected profit pˆii of firm i is
pˆii = (fx− c1αi) + E(p)
(
−x+ αi − c1αi − c2
2
α2i
)
+ E(p2)
(
βi − c2
2
β2i
)
= (fx− c1αi) + E(p)
(
−x+ αi − c1αi − c2
2
α2i
)
+
(
E(p)2 + Var(p)
) (
βi − c2
2
β2i
)
= pii,ε=0 + Var(p)
(
βi − c2
2
β2i
)
where the last step used the expression (9) for ex-post realised profits and pii,ε=0
denotes realised profits when the demand shock is exactly at its expected value.
Equation (1) allows to derive Var(p) = σ2(b+ βi + βj)
−2. Thus,
pˆii = pii,ε=0 + σ
2
(
βi − c22 β2i
(b+ βi + βj)2
)
. (10)
Lemma 1 summarises the effect of selling forward on expected profits when both
firms play Nash in the spot market.
Lemma 1.
(a) The expected one-shot Nash equilibrium profit pˆini of firm i is monotonically
decreasing in the number of forward contracts it sells. Precisely,
dpˆini
dxi
< 0 for xi > 0 and
dpˆini
dxi
= 0 for xi = 0
(b) The expected one-shot Nash equilibrium profit pˆini of firm i is monotonically
decreasing and concave in a joint increase of the forward contracts x = xi =
xj sold by both firms.
A proof is given in Appendix A.1. Lemma 1.b is needed for the discussion in
Section 3. Lemma 1.a implies that firms don’t sell forward in equilibrium. The
reason for this is twofold: on the one hand, selling forward means committing to
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expand the output in the spot market, thus making the market more competitive.
On the other hand, selling forward does not provide a strategic leverage to the
behaviour of the competitor. All strategic interactions between the two firms work
through the supply functions’ slope, but forward sales only affect the intercept.
Selling forward therefore does not allow to strategically alter the rivals supply
function.
2.3 Joint Profit Maximisation
Assume for the moment, that producers can effectively collude to maximise joint
profits. Such a cartel would act as a monopolist that controls all the supply in
the spot market, but still faces competitive speculators in the forward market.
Knowing that f = E(p), one could na¨ıvely presume that forward positions cancel
out from the profit function (2). Thus, the cartel would be indifferent to the
number of forward contracts it sells; optimal spot market strategies would be
equivalent to Ciarreta and Gutie´rrez-Hita (2006).4
βc =
b
2 + c2b
(11)
αc =
−bc1
2 + c2b
(12)
However, backward induction shows that there is a commitment issue for such a
virtual monopolist. Let pic denote the ex-post one period profit of a firm given
that both firms collude and pˆic its expected value. Lemma 2 states that these are
unaffected by the possibility of trading forward for two reasons.
Lemma 2. Expected collusive profits pˆic are unaffected by the possibility of trading
forward because
(a) absent any additional commitment mechanism, a cartel will not sell forward.
(b) when firms credibly commit to play supply functions qi = qj = αc + βcp
defined in (11) and (12) in the subsequent spot market, selling forward has
no effect on expected profits and the cartel is indifferent to the number of
forward contracts it sells.
A proof for Lemma 2 is given in Appendix A.2. The reason for Lemma 2.a
is that selling forward is equivalent to committing to a higher output in the spot
market which negatively affects the cartels profit. Lemma 2.b just summarises
what happens if this commitment effect is ruled out. Because firms are risk neu-
tral and expected profits remain unchanged, the cartel is then indifferent to its
forward positions. Section 3 discusses whether a collusive agreement in a repeated
game provides a commitment as described in Lemma 2.b. Either way, joint profit
4Ciarreta and Gutie´rrez-Hita (2006) assume c1 to be zero. (12) is adjusted to account for a
positive intercept of marginal costs.
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maximising firms will stick to the supply functions given by (11) and (12). The
resulting expected spot price is denoted as p¯c in the following.
p¯c = E(pc) =
A− 2αc
b+ 2βc
, (13)
3 Collusion
3.1 Collusion in the repeated game
Consider now the case of infinitely many interactions of the same two firms on,
first, the forward market, then the corresponding spot market, then the forward
market for the next period, and so on. For simplicity, forward sales are restricted
to the upcoming spot market.5 Firms discount profits from one spot market to
the next by a constant factor δ ∈ (0, 1). The one-shot Nash-equilibrium is also an
equilibrium for the repeated game. But the joint profits would be higher (maximal)
if firms could implement the cartel solution in every period. Sustainability of such
collusion is studied with standard grim trigger punishment strategies where firms
revert permanently to the one-shot Nash equilibrium whenever a firm deviates from
the collusive supply function. A deviating firm can thus at best earn deviation
profits once. Let pˆid denote the expected one-period profit of a deviating firm and
recall that pˆic and pˆin are the corresponding profits of collusion and the one-shot
Nash equilibrium respectively. The well-known incentive constraint for sustained
collusion is
pˆic
1− δ ≥ pˆi
d + pˆin
δ
1− δ
With pˆid > pˆic > pˆin, the critical discount factor δ for which the incentive constraint
is binding is
δ =
pˆid − pˆic
pˆid − pˆin (14)
Whenever δ ≥ δ, producers maintain collusion. Under this condition, speculators
can rationally expect the spot market price to be at the collusion level and buy
any quantity forward at a per unit price f = p¯c. From Lemma 2.b we know that
colluding firms are then indifferent to their forward sales with respect to profits.
Thus they are free to choose forward positions so as to minimise the incentive for
deviation.
3.2 Deviation
We first consider deviation on the spot market, then study the effect of forward
sales on profits from such deviation, and finally discuss the resulting choices of
5A generalisation to several openings of the forward market for the same spot market or to
forward contracts spanning several spot market openings as in Green and Le Coq (2010) does
not provide fundamentally different insights.
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firms and speculators in the forward market.
Suppose a collusive agreement is in place and firm i sells forward some quan-
tity xi at a price f = p¯c. We consider a situation wherein the deviation in the
spot market comes as a surprise. (Regardless of this outcome not being a rational
expectations equilibrium, the threat is relevant for the colluding firms and specu-
lators to take into account.) A deviator in the spot market plays the best response
given by (5) and (6) against the collusive supply function of its rival.
βd = BR(βc) and αd = α
∗
i (xi, βd, βc). (15)
Lemma 3 summarises the effect of xi on the profits from deviation.
Lemma 3. Expected profits pˆid of a firm, deviating in the spot market, are convex
and increasing with the number of its forward sales, irrespective of the forward
position of its rival.
A proof of Lemma 3 is in Appendix A.3. In brief, it states that a deviator in
the spot market would like to have sold forward as much as possible to earn a rent
from the mistaken beliefs of the speculators. The speculators need to consider this
threat before buying forward when a collusive agreement is in place. Section 5.1
discusses this aspect in further detail.
3.3 Sustainability of collusion with forward contracts
Consider the definition of δ in (14) and an increase in the number of forward
contracts xi sold during collusion by a potential deviator. According to Lemma 2,
collusive profits pˆic remain unchanged. According to Lemma 3, profits of deviation
pˆid increase. Profits during the punishment phase pˆin are unaffected. Evidently,
the more that has been sold forward during collusion, the higher the incentive to
deviate and the higher the critical discount factor. Now consider an increase in the
number of forwards that firms sell during the punishment phase. Such a change
will solely affect the expected profits of punishment pˆin, and it will do so negatively
(see Lemma 1). Thus, the critical discount factor δ will decrease with increasing
forward sales in the punishment phase.
Let (xi,c, xj,c) denote the forward positions of firms during collusion and (xi,n, xj,n)
the forward position of firms during Nash reversion. The above given argument is
summarised in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1.
(a) Collusion is harder to sustain when firms sell forward during collusion. More
precisely, the critical discount factor δ increases in max(xi,c, xj,c).
(b) Collusion is easier to sustain when firms expect significant forward sales dur-
ing the punishment phase, meaning, the critical discount factor decreases with
a joint increase of xi,n and xj,n.
Proposition 1 implies that, in order to minimize the incentive to deviate, the
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colluding firms should not sell forward at all. Nevertheless, collusive equilibria
with positive forward sales exist. The complete characterisation of the collusive
equilibrium is as follows: For every forward market opening, firms i and j sub-
mit offers xi,c, xj,c ≥ 0 which are bounded from above by the condition that the
incentive constraint δ ≥ δ holds even for xi = 2xi,c or xj = 2xj,c. Speculators
s = 1, ..., S observe (xi + xj), deduce that collusion will hold in the spot market,
and bid fs = p¯c. In every spot market, firms bid the joint profit maximising supply
function given by (11) and (12).
The off-equilibrium beliefs and strategies are as follows: whenever the total
amount of offered contracts exceeds xi,c + xj,c, speculators infer deviation and bid
fs equal to the expected spot price that obtains if both firms play their one-shot
Nash strategies (6) and (7) for some xi, xj, matching the observed amount of
offered contracts.6 Whenever the forward market clears at a price other than p¯c,
it is common knowledge that collusion broke. The firms i and j then bid their
one-shot Nash strategies in the spot market. Section 5.1 discusses the range of
possible forward sales during collusion against the backdrop of different degrees of
transparency.
Proposition 1 also allows to sort the case of competition in supply functions
among those cases that have been studied in the literature. Liski and Montero
(2006) have found diametrical effects of forward sales on collusion in price versus
quantity competition. The result for competition in supply functions summarised
in Proposition 1 resembles that for quantity competition found by Liski and Mon-
tero. It clearly contrasts with their result for price competition in the spot market.
Figure 2 illustrates the mechanics behind Proposition 1, depicting the expected
profits in three regimes over varying levels of contracted quantities. The critical
discount factor δ has a graphical interpretation: for a given level of contracting
during collusion, δ is equivalent to the distance between deviation profits and
collusive profits, divided by the vertical distance between deviation profits and
one-shot Nash profits at the expected level of contracting during Nash reversion.
The argument which leads to Proposition 1 also implies Corollary 1 which
is needed for the discussion in Section 4. Let δ0 denote the critical discount
factor with zero forward sales of the potential deviator and zero forward sales
xi = xj = xn during the punishment phase.
δ0 = δ such that xc = xn = 0 and δ as in (14) (16)
In short, δ0 describes the critical discount factor which would prevail when there
are no forward markets.
Corollary 1. There are infinitely many combinations (xc, xn) of forward posi-
tions xc held by a deviating firm, and forward positions xi = xj = xn held by both
firms during the punishment phase, such that δ = δ0.
6Note that with symmetric slopes of supply functions in the spot market, xi+xj is a sufficient
statistic to predict the expected spot price.
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no forward sales
deviation profits pˆidi
collusive profits pˆici
one-shot Nash profits pˆini
xi
profits
Figure 2: Profits across varying levels of forward contracting (symmetric forward
positions in the case of Nash equilibrium profits).
Proof. Immediate from definition (14), Lemma 1 to 3 (especially the monotonicity
plus concavity/convexity results in Lemma 1.b and Lemma 3), and the fact that
profits are continuous in the level of forward sales.
4 The impact of demand uncertainty on collu-
sion
The literature on supply function equilibrium often assumes some variation of
demand to identify optimal price-quantity schedules, but the profit effect of that
variation is ignored. Ciarreta and Gutie´rrez-Hita (2006), for example, do not
discuss the effect of demand shocks on collusion, although demand uncertainty
is present in their model. At first glance this is surprising because the range of
potential profit margins increases with higher variability of demand. The critical
discount factor δ is a ratio of profits in different regimes, and it is not obvious
that this ratio needs to be constant across varying levels of demand uncertainty.
The following Proposition therefore complements the results from the preceding
section and those of Ciarreta and Gutie´rrez-Hita (2006).
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Proposition 2.
a. When the critical level of the discount factor is equivalent to that, which
would prevail without any forward sales, δ = δ0, then it is unaffected by a
change in the variance σ2 of the demand shock ε.
b. When forward sales of firms during collusion or during the punishment phase
are such that δ 6= δ0, then the critical factor decreases with σ2 for any δ > δ0.
It increases with σ2 for any δ < δ0
Proposition 2.a implies that in the study of Ciarreta and Gutie´rrez-Hita (2006)
it is safe to ignore the effect of demand uncertainty. It simply cancels from the
incentive constraint when there are no forward markets. Proposition 2.b can be
resumed a bit more intuitively as: the larger the variability of demand, the smaller
the effect of forward positions on the critical discount factor. A proof of Proposi-
tion 2 is given in Appendix A.5. The general reasoning for the proof is explained
below. It requires the following Lemma.
Lemma 4. The derivatives of expected profits of deviation, collusion, and Nash-
reversion with respect to σ2 can be ordered as follows:
dpˆid
dσ2
>
dpˆic
dσ2
>
dpˆin
dσ2
The proof for Lemma 4 is in Appendix A.4. It is illustrated in Figure 3.
Expected profits of deviation are larger than collusive profits, which are larger than
one-shot Nash equilibrium profits. Lemma 4 states that the same ordering applies
to the derivatives of these profits with respect to demand variability: profits of
deviation rise stronger with σ2 than those from collusion, which again rise stronger
with σ2 than those from the one-shot Nash equilibrium. Due to the overall linearity
of expected profits (see Eq. 10), we can use the Basic Proportionality Theorem to
evaluate the change of ratios of profit differences over σ2. Consider the three lines
tracing through the points B, C, and D in Figure 3. They represent the expected
one-period profits in the three regimes without any forward sales. There is a
common point of intersection at σ2 = −(A− bc1)2. Obviously, a negative value for
the variance has no practical interpretation. But the common point of intersection
implies the following: Any parallel line to the one that intersects expected profits
in B, C, and D, will also hit the lines representing expected profits, and it will be
segmented in equivalent proportion to the segments spanning between B, C, and
D, respectively.
As an example, take two vertical lines, one at σ2, one at σ2
′
. The basic propor-
tionality theorem implies that the ratio of the distances BC/BD is the same as the
ratio of B’C’/B’D’. These ratios are equivalent to the fraction (pˆid− pˆic)/(pˆid− pˆin),
evaluated at two different level of σ2. Because only the case without any forward
sales is considered here, this ratio is equivalent to δ0 defined in (16). Therefore,
without forward sales during collusion, deviation or Nash reversion, the discount
factor δ0 is the same for any level of σ
2.
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−(A− bc1)2 σ2 σ2′
deviation profits pˆid with forwards
E
E’ deviation profits pˆid, no forwards
B
B’
collusive profits pˆic
C
C’
one-shot Nash profits pˆin, no forwards
D
D’
variance of demand
expected profits
Figure 3: Expected profits over variance of demand shocks σ2
The proof in the Appendix A.5 shows that there is always a common point
of intersection when there are no forward sales during collusion or during the
punishment phase, leading to Proposition 2.a. It also extends the argument to
cases with positive forward sales, leading to Proposition 2.b.
5 Generalisations
5.1 Implications of different informational environments
The following paragraphs provide a short, non-formal discussion about the observ-
ability of forward positions and the implications for regulation.
We have seen that colluding firms should have no interest in selling forward,
but some forward sales (e.g. imposed by regulatory obligations) might still be com-
patible with sustained collusion. The same condition – given its full observability
– implies that speculators can rationally expect collusion to hold in the subsequent
spot market. When speculators observe the individual quantities of forward con-
tracts offered by each firm (xi, xj), they can deduce the incentive constraint for
the firm that is most prone to deviation, evaluate whether the incentive constraint
holds for this firm, and thus determine if they can rationally buy forward contracts
at the expected collusive price.
If speculators observe only the aggregated forward volume (xi+xj) as assumed
before, it could be that all these contracts are from just one firm, and that this firm
is the potential deviator. The upper bound on xi,c, xj,c is strictly lower compared
to the situation with fully observable forward offers. Less transparency therefore
reduces the amount of contracts that speculators are willing to buy at the expected
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collusive price.
In the extreme case, consider the situation where each speculator receives an
individual offer to buy forward contracts. No speculator knows how much is offered
by a particular firm to the other speculators. Considering that the offer might
come from a potential deviator who sells as an insider, no speculator can plausibly
predict an average spot price that won’t be prone to undercutting by a deviator.
Thus no speculator will buy forward whatever the price (e.g. fs → −∞ for all
s = 1, ..., N) to ensure profits of at least zero.7 Anticipating this outcome of the
forward market, the producing firms will not offer any forward contracts in the
first place.
This has important implications for anti-trust and financial transparency reg-
ulations: When commodity producers cannot credibly signal a sufficiently tight
upper bound of their forward positions to speculators and rivals, the mere exis-
tence of liquid and anonymous forward markets rules out the possibility of tacit
collusion. Indeed, Mercadal (2018) provides evidence for collusive conduct in the
US Midwest electricity market which came to an end when new regulation sub-
stantially increased the liquidity of forward markets, which is exactly in line with
the argument made in this paper. On the contrary, collusion might be eased by
financial regulation that obliges firms to disclose timely and truthfully all the for-
ward positions they take, or if it puts specific limits on these positions, such as
e.g. the European Union Markets in Financial Instruments Directive / Regulation
(MIFID / MIFIR).
5.2 Physical vs. Financial Forwards
Nowadays, most commodities are traded forward for both physical and financial
delivery. Liski and Montero (2006) point out that in homogeneous goods and with
price competition, financial contracts might have a substantially different effect
on collusion as compared to physical contracts. The following paragraphs show
that in my setting, considering physical forward contracts is equivalent in terms
of equilibrium price and revenues to pure financial forward contracts which have
been studied before.
Let xi,f , xj,f denote financially contracted quantities, cleared by a balancing
payment equal to the (positive or negative) difference f − p from the buyer to the
seller when the spot market clears. Physical forward sales xi,φ, xj,φ oblige the seller
to produce the corresponding output in addition to its spot market sales and allow
the buyer to consume this output without buying it on the corresponding spot mar-
ket. The buyer pays the contracted price to the seller upon delivery. Thus, buying
physically forward is equivalent to buying on the spot market plus a financial for-
ward contract as a hedge. We assume the buyers of physical forward contracts
7Admittedly, this argument relies on the questionable assumption that firms have unlimited
capacity and therefore unlimited capability to manipulate the spot price. Here, its purpose
is to illustrate the relevance of information for a functioning forward market when a collusive
agreement is in place.
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to act rationally and competitively, imposing a basic no-arbitrage condition that
guarantees identical forward prices for the physically and the financially settled
contracts, jointly denoted by f . Spot market demand is now D(p) − xi,φ − xj,φ
because some demand has already been contracted in advance. qi, qj still denote
total output of firms, but this is not necessarily equal to spot market supply any
more. Let si(p), sj(p) denote the spot market supply functions of the linear form,
si = αi + βip, and note that qi = xi,φ + si(p). Although the firms’ output must
be non-negative8, supply in the spot market can be either positive or negative; in
other words, firms might buy back on the spot market what they have sold forward
before. The profit function then becomes
pii = (f − p)xi,f + fxi,φ + psi(p)− c1(si(p) + xi,φ)− c2
2
(si(p) + xi,φ)
2
The derivation of optimal strategies follows the same procedure as in Section 2.
The first order condition, equivalent to Equ. (4), is now
dpii
dp
= si − xi,f − (b+ βj)(p− c1 − c2(xi,φ + si)) = 0,
Using si = si(p) = αi+βip and setting all factors multiplying p at the same power
to be equal yields the same optimal slope βi as in (5) which is independent of the
firms’ forward positions. The intercept, however, now accounts for the physically
forward contracted quantities. Its definition (6) is generalised as follows:
α∗i = βi
(
xi,f
b+ βj
− c1 − c2xi,φ
)
(6′)
The spot price is determined by the market clearing condition.
p =
A− αi − αj − xi,φ − xi,φ + ε
b− βi − βj ,
Take the definition in (6′) and note that with Equ. (5), βi/(b+βj) can be expressed
as 1− βic2. The market clearing price becomes:
p =
A+ ε− (xi,φ + xj,φ + xi,f + xj,f )(1− βn) + 2βnc2
b− 2βn .
This shows that physical (xi,φ, xj,φ) and financial forward positions (xi,f , xj,f ) have
an identical effect on the one-shot Nash equilibrium price in the spot market, and
consequently on total output. It is also easy to verify that the produced quantities
qi and qj are the same for a given level of forward sales, independent if these are
financial or physical forward contracts. Moreover, the optimal collusive strategy
obviously does not change due to the mere possibility of selling physically forward,
8Non-negativity of firms’ output is still secured by the assumption, (A + ε)/b > c1)∀ε, but
this is less evident from the notation here.
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and the same applies for the incentives to deviate. The strategic effect of either
form of contracting is equivalent.
The main difference between physical and financial forwards is that the former
substitute trade in the spot market, thus reducing the observed volumes. The
spot market ‘supply function’ now extends to negative quantities as illustrated in
Figure 4. This might be of relevance when studying real world markets where
a-priori firms forward contracts might specify a financial or physical settlement.
xf
no forward trading
xφ = 0, xf = 0
physical forward trading
xφ > 0, xf = 0
financial forward trading
xφ = 0, xf > 0
marginal costs
α(xφ > 0)
c1
spot market supply / output
price / cost
Figure 4: Spot supply of firms with physical vs. financial forward positions
5.3 Non-linear supply functions
The linear SFE model – although widely used – represents a special case where for-
ward sales are strategically neutral and firms have no strategic incentive to engage
in the forward market. Empirically, however, it is observed that most producers
sell large proportions of their output forward, e.g. in electricity markets. Further-
more, the supply functions in these markets are typically non-linear e.g. due to
non-linear marginal costs or limited production capacities. Klemperer and Meyer
(1989) show that, if supply functions are non-linear, a multitude of Nash equilib-
ria exists, where supply functions are bound from above by the curve that finally
becomes inelastic and hits the Cournot price and quantity for the maximum real-
isation of demand. A lower bound is given by the supply function that intersects
marginal costs at maximum demand. The following paragraphs will argue that
the main insight from the previous analysis, summarised in Proposition 1, remains
true even for a more general setting with non-linear supply functions. The discus-
sion, however, will remain fairly general without determining firms’ spot market
strategies in very detail.
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Consider a setting equivalent to the one described in Section 2in which the cost
can take the form of any continuous, monotonically increasing, convex, and twice
differentiable function C(q), and firms i and j can bid any continuous, twice differ-
entiable, monotonically increasing supply function qi(p) =, qj(p) > 0, respectively.
Assume that the demand shock ε has sufficiently wide support such that the firms
will optimise their supply function for all possible prices studied in the following.
The first order condition for profit maximisation is given in (3). We can rewrite it
as
qi − xi = (q′j −D′) (p− C ′ (qi)) .
Because (q′j−D′) is strictly positive, we know that in equilibrium i will bid a price
equal to marginal costs for qi = xi and no other quantity. Take a point (p0, q0) in
the price-quantity plane such that p0 > C(q0). This point will be on the optimal
supply curve of i if and only if qi > xi. Conversely, qi < xi implies a price bid of
i such that p < C ′(qi). Figure 1 can still serve as an illustration: positive forward
sales shift the supply function outwards to hit marginal costs at the contracted
quantity. But due to the potential non-linearity, the overall shape of the curve is
not specified.
An increase of xi for a given quantity qi will reduce the left hand side of the
equation given above. For the equation to hold, the right hand side needs to
decrease by the same amount, e.g. by a lower price p or by a less elastic residual
demand (a change in (q′j − D′). In summary, an increase of forward sales xi will
make firm i bid more aggressively.
So how would this affect the possibility of collusion? The results for the linear
case are summarised in Proposition 1. Necessary and sufficient conditions for
Proposition 1 are given in Lemmas 1 to 3. The following paragraphs discuss how
these Lemmas apply to the non-linear case.
Consider Lemma 1: The profits of firms in the one-shot Nash equilibrium
decrease with forward sales because contracting increases competition in the spot
market. As argued above, and as already discussed by e.g. Green (1999, pp. 115-
116) and Holmberg (2011), the same is true when supply functions are non-linear.
Selling forward will make firms bid more aggressively in the spot market, which
increases competition and decreases profits. Moreover, Holmberg (2011) shows
under fairly general conditions that with non-linear supply functions, forward sales
are not strategically neutral anymore. By selling forward, firms can commit to a
spot market strategy that alters the spot market strategy of the rival. As a result,
both firms will sell forward and both firms will be worse off than they would be
without a forward market.
Consider Lemma 2: Collusive profits are unaffected by the possibility of selling
forward. This is also true when supply functions are non-linear. The monopoly
solution maximises joint profits in the spot market, and the forward market does
not bring additional demand. Additional profits from selling forward could only
be obtained from a difference between spot and forward prices, which contradicts
the assumption of a competitive forward market. Thus, colluding firms optimally
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implement the joint profit maximising supply function (which can be linear or
otherwise) independent of their forward positions.
Consider Lemma 3: A deviating firm earns both at the expense of its rivals
and that of the speculators. After the forward price is locked in at the collusive
level, the deviator plays its spot market best response q∗i (p) to the collusive supply
function qcj(p) of its rival, where q
∗
i (p) fulfils the first order condition (3). Implicitly,
the best response of i therefore solves the equivalent first order condition
dpii
dq∗i (p)
= 0 for all p.
The derivative of profits of deviation with respect to the number of forwards sold
by the deviating firm can be decomposed as follows (with f fixed in advance):
dpidi
dxi
=
∂pidi
∂xi
+
(
∂pidi
∂pi
dp
dqi(p)
+
∂pidi
∂qi(p)
)
dq∗i (p)
dxi
.
In the decomposition above, the whole term in parentheses multiplyed by q∗i (p)/xi
equals zero by definition of qdi (p) as firm i’s best response. This allows us to
simplify:
dpidi
dxi
=
∂pidi
∂xi
= f − p
which is equivalent to the finding in Lemma 3 for the linear case (see Appendix A.3).
Taken together, we find that Lemmas 1 to 3 also hold for the case of non-
linear supply functions. These were the necessary and sufficient conditions for
Proposition 1. Thus, Proposition 1 holds even for non-linear supply functions in
the spot market.
But Holmberg (2011) shows that non-linear supply function equilibria provide
endogenous incentives to sell forward. Thus, in contrast to the model in Section 3,
the non-linear case gives rise to forward positions that emerge from the firms
strategic considerations: Colluding firms will not sell forward as they have nothing
to gain. A deviating firm could raise additional profits by selling forward at the
collusive price and then deviating in the spot market. But speculators with that
suspicion will not buy forward. And the one-shot Nash equilibrium is characterised
by positive strategic forward sales of the firms, trying to tilt the supply function of
their rival. With this endogenous incentive to sell forward during the punishment
phase, the punishment is credibly harsher than it would be without a forward
market. Thus, forward markets increase the range of discount factors for which
collusion can be sustained.
Proposition 2 is less straight-forward to generalise. In a non-linear SFE, the
price-cost margin evolves non-linearly along the supply function and therefore
profits are non-linear in the demand shock. Depending on the functional form
of collusive, deviation, and Nash profits, increasing uncertainty might potentially
stabilise or destabilise a collusive agreement.
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6 Conclusion
This paper has shown how forward sales of firms affect the stability of a collusive
agreement when firms compete in supply functions in the spot market. Forward
markets can facilitate collusion by increasing competition during the punishment
phase. On the contrary, a forward market can destabilise collusion when firms find
the possibility of selling forward as an insider during collusion. A deviating firm
would seek to sell forward at an expected collusive price, and profit at the expense
of rivals and speculators by depressing the spot price. For to maintain collusion,
firms will not sell forward at all, or carefully control the volumes of forward sales in
relation to the overall output of the firms. The other market side is governed by a
similar concern: Speculators will refrain from buying forward contracts when they
suspect the collusive agreement to be infringed in the subsequent spot market.
Either way, a collusive agreement is incompatible with the existence of liquid
and anonymous forward markets where a deviating firm could sell large amounts
forward undetectedly. In my view, this is an important insight for anti-trust and
transparency regulation of oligopolistic commodity markets.
The findings are robust against a number of generalisations. Uncertainty of
demand does not necessarily work against collusion. Instead, it has an ambigu-
ous effect such that increasing demand uncertainty reduces the impact of forward
positions on the critical discount factor. Moreover, the physical versus financial
forward contracts distinction made in the literature (Allaz and Vila, 1993; Ferreira,
2003; Liski and Montero, 2006; Green and Le Coq, 2010) is irrelevant in a setting
in which firms bid supply functions in the spot market. Researchers conducting
empirical studies, however, should bear in mind that financial forwards can in-
centivise firms to bid below their marginal costs, while physical forwards can put
producers in the buyer-side on the spot market. Both these effects together can
yield a large variety of possible bidding functions in empirical examples. Most im-
portantly, the core result of the effect of forward contracts on collusion also holds
for a more general case of non-linear supply functions in the spot market.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1.a: We know from the firm’ s best response (6) and (5) that the forward
position xi affects the spot market strategy of firm i solely through αi, and that
there is no strategic reaction from the rival firm j to a change that solely affects
i’s intercept. Moreover, the effect of demand uncertainty on expected profits is
additively separable and does not depend on αi or αj (see (10) in the paper).
Based on a simple envelope argument, we can decompose the derivative of firm i’s
expected profit with respect to xi as follows:
dpˆii
dxi
=
∂pii,ε=0
∂xi
+
dpii,ε=0
dαi
dαi
dxi
.
In the one-shot Nash equilibrium, firm i chooses its supply function in the spot
market optimally, thus αi = α
∗
i and dpi
n
i /dα
∗
i = 0, conditional on a predetermined
forward price f . Again using a simple envelope argument, the decomposition above
becomes
dpˆini
dxi
=
∂pini,ε=0
∂xi
+
∂pini,ε=0
∂f
· df
dαi
· dα
∗
i
dxi
(A.1)
= (f − p¯n) + xi df
dαi
dα∗i
dxi
.
The competitive forward market equilibrium implies f = E(p) = p¯n, thus,
dpˆini
dxi
= xi
dp¯n
dα∗i
dα∗i
dxi
.
From (8) we know dp¯n/dαi < 0 and from (6) dα
∗
i /dxi > 0. So dpˆi
n
i /dxi is zero for
xi = 0 and negative for any xi > 0.
Lemma 1.b: A change in forward sales xj of i’s rival translates into an isolated
change of firm j’s supply function intercept αj, which affects the spot market
clearing price p. Speculators observe xj and update their expectations accordingly,
which affects the forward price f .
dpˆini
dxj
=
(
dpii,ε=0
df
df
dα∗j
dα∗j
dxj
+
dpii,ε=0
dp¯n
dp¯n
dα∗j
)
dα∗j
dxj
Because dfdα∗j = dp¯ndα
∗
j , the expected revenues from i’s forward sales xi(f − p¯n)
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are unaffected. The above derivative then becomes
dpˆini
dxj
=
d
dp¯n
(p¯nqi − C(qi))
= (qi + q
′
i (p¯n − c1 − c2qi))
dp¯n
dα∗j
dα∗j
dxj
Consider the first order condition (4) which has to hold for any spot price p and
use qi = αi + βip to express the profit margin (p− c1 − c2qi) as (qi − xi)/(b+ βj).
dpˆini
dxj
=
(
qi + βi
qi − xi
b+ βj
)
dp¯n
dα∗j
dα∗j
dxj
For a joint variation dxi = dxj = dx and with symmetric spot market strategies
βn and α
∗
i = α
∗
j ,
dpˆini
dx
=
(
x+ qi + βn
qi − x
b+ βn
)
dp¯n
dαi
dα∗
dx
=
(
bx+ (b+ 2βn)qi
b+ βn
) −1
b+ 2βn
βn
b+ βn
=
−βn
(b+ βn)2
(
b
b+ 2βn
x+ qi
)
,
which is negative because the production qi is always strictly positive and x ≥ 0,
therefore, the profit of i decreases with a joint increase of forwards sales x.
For the second derivative,
d2pˆini
dx2
=
−βn
(b+ βn)2
(
dqi
dx
+
b
b+ 2βn
)
, (A.2)
use the definition of the optimal strategies in (5) and (6) to substite α∗i and express
the best response supply function of i given βj as:
q∗i = β
∗
i
(
p− c1 + xi
b+ βj
)
.
Then obtain
dq∗i
dx
= β∗i
(
1
b+ βj
+
dp
dαi
dαi
dxi
+
dp
dαj
dαj
dxj
)
.
In the symmetric case, substitute βi = βj = βn and αj = α
∗
i into (1) to derive
dq∗i
dx
= βn
(
1
b+ βn
+
−2βn
(b+ βn)(b+ 2βn)
)
=
bβn
(b+ βn)(b+ 2βn)
.
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Substituting into (A.2) yields
d2pˆini
dx2
=
−βn
(b+ βn)2
(
bβn
(b+ βn)(b+ 2βn)
+
b
b+ 2βn
)
which is negative due to the negative sign of the first factor whereas βn, b > 0.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
The joint profit maximising supply function is set to implement optimal quantities
for any possible spot price, given forward positions xi, xj and the forward price f .
Following the procedure as for the one-shot Nash case, we find the optimal slope
parameter to be the one in (11), whereas the optimal intercept is
αij =
xi + xj − bc1
2 + c2b
, (A.3)
which increases with larger forward sales xi, xj. So the cartel will find it profitable
to expand output after having sold forward. Assume, for notational convenience,
that the colluding firms have symmetric forward sales xi = xj = xc. Note that
from Equation (10), the effect of demand uncertainty σ2 on expected profits is
additively separable and does not depend on xi, xj, αi, or αj, thus
dpˆic
dxc
=
dpicε=0
dxc
.
For a decomposition, note that forward sales can affect profits directly, and through
their effect on spot market strategies, which in turn determine prices. Using a
simple envelope argument, the derivative of the expected joint profits with respect
to xc can be decomposed as follows
d2pˆic
dxc
=
∂2picε=0
∂xc
+
(
∂2picε=0
∂f
df
dαij
+
d2picε=0
dpε=0
dpε=0
dαij
)
dαij
dxc
,
We know that the derivative
d2picε=0
dpε=0
is zero because the cartel chooses its supply
functions optimally for any price p given f and xc. Moreover, the forward market
is in equilibrium if and only if f = E(p), thus
∂picε=0
∂xc
= f−pε=0 = 0 and dfdαij =
dpε=0
dαij
.
With
∂2picε=0
∂f
= 2xc, the decomposition above reduces to
d2pˆic
dxc
= 2xc
dpε=0
dαij
dαij
dxc
.
dpε=0
dαij
describes the adjustment of the expected spot price to a change in the sym-
metric supply functions intercept of the colluding firms. Consider the following
two cases which correspond to Lemma 2.a and 2.b.
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(a) When firms adjust their supply functions in the spot market optimally to
their forward positions by chosing αij as given in (A.3), we have
dpε=0
dαij
dαij
dxc
6= 0.
Thus, profit maximisation requires xc = 0.
(b) However, when firms do have a credible commitment mechanism to stick
to the supply function defined by βc and αc in (11) and (12), this implies
d2pˆic
dxc
= 0 for any xc. Thus the cartel is indifferent to selling forward.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
A firm deviating in the spot market is playing its best response. Following the
same argument as before, we can decompose the derivative of firm i’s expected
profit with respect to its own forward sales as in Equation (A.1):
dpˆidi
dxi
=
∂pidi,ε=0
∂xi
+
∂pidi,ε=0
∂f
· df
dαi
· dα
∗
i
dxi
Before deviating in the spot market, firm i has sold forward at the collusive price
f = p¯c. Because we assume that deviation is a surprise, the forward price does not
reflect the spot market strategy of the deviator, thus df/dαi = 0, and the above
decomposition reduces to
dpˆidi
dxi
=
∂pidi,ε=0
∂xi
= f − pε=0 = p¯c − p¯d
where p¯d describes the spot price (1) at the expected level of demand (ε = 0) when
i deviates as in (15) and j plays the collusive supply function as in (11) and (12).
And because the forward price during collusion f = p¯c is larger than the expected
realised spot price when i deviates, the difference above is positive.
Knowing that f is constant in xi, the second derivative is
d2pˆid
dx2i
= −dp¯d
dαi
dα∗i
dxi
.
As dp/dαi < 1 and dα
∗
i /dxi > 0, we can conclude that the expected profits of a
deviating firm i are convex and increasing with its own forward sales xi.
With the rival firm j sticking to the collusive supply function, xj has no effect
on j’s spot market strategy and consequently no effect on the profit of firm i.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Consider the definition of expected profits in (10) and its derivative with respect
to σ2
dpˆii
dσ2
=
βi − c22 β2i
(b+ βi + βj)2
.
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The numerator is positive for 0 < βi < 2/c2, which is true for the collusive bid
as well as for any best response bid (straight-forward to check from definitions (5)
and (11)). Thus, we know that the derivative of pˆii with respect to σ
2 is positive
in all the relevant cases.
The order of derivatives of collusive, deviation, and one-shot Nash profits can
be studied conveniently in terms of the strategy parameters βi and βj. Consider
the following cross derivative:
d2pˆii
dσ2dβi
=
(1− c2βi)(b+ βi + βj)2 − 2(b+ βi + βj)(βi − c22 β2i )
(b+ βi + βj)4
=
(b+ βj)− βi(1 + c2(b+ βj))
(b+ βi + βj)3
Note that the latter expression is exactly zero whenever βi is the best response
β∗i , as given in Equation (5). It is strictly positive when βi is less than the best
response. We know that the deviator plays its best response to the collusive
supply function, and that this best response is a more elastic supply curve than
the collusive one, βd = BR(βc) > βc, therefore
dpˆid
dσ2
>
dpˆic
dσ2
.
Now, consider another cross derivative, this time for the effect of a joint varia-
tion of slopes βi = βj = β.
d2pˆii
dσ2dβ
=
(1− c2β)(b+ 2β)2 − 4(b+ 2β)(β − c22 β2)
(b+ 2β)4
=
b− β(2 + c2b)
(b+ 2β)3
This derivative is zero for β = βc given by Equation (11) and negative for all β > βc.
Firms play symmetric strategies both in collusion and in one-shot Nash equilibrium
(the punishment phase), but supply increases less with higher spot prices during
collusion than it does in one-shot Nash equilibrium, βn > βc. Therefore
dpˆic
dσ2
>
dpˆin
dσ2
.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2.a: Section 4 explains how the Basic Proportionality Theorem can
be applied, given that expected one period profits of deviation, collusion and one-
shot Nash equilibrium as functions of σ2 have a common point of intersection. The
following paragraphs show that this is always the case when there are no forward
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sales. Consider Equation (2) for the ex-post realised profits of firm i. Without
forward sales (xi = xj = x = 0), this can be rewritten as
pii,x=0 = qi(p)
(
p− c1 − c2
2
qi(p)
)
. (A.4)
Note that with xi = 0, the supply function intercept αi reduces to αi = −βic1
(equivalently αj = βjc1), irrespective of firm i being in collusion (12) or playing its
best response (6). Thus, i’s quantity can be expressed as qi = αi+βip = βi(p−c1).
Substituting into (A.4) gives
pii,x=0 = (βi − c2
2
β2i )(p− c1)2
Now consider the spot market clearing price p from Equation (1) and set ε = 0:
p =
A− αi − αj
b+ βi + βj
=
A+ ε− (βi + βj)c1
b+ βi + βj
,
thus,
p− c1 = A− (βi + βj)c1
b+ βi + βj
− c1
=
A− bc1
b+ βi + βj
.
Substituting p− c1 into the the expression for pii,x=0 above yields
pii,x=0 =
(
A− bc1
b+ βi + βj
)2
(βi − c2
2
β2i ).
Reconsider the expression for expected profits pˆii from Equation (10), and replace
pii,ε=0 with pii,x=0 as defined above.
pˆii,xi=0 = pii,x=0 + σ
2
(
βi − c22 β2i
(b+ βi + βj)2
)
=
βi − c22 β2i
(b+ βi + βj)2
(
(A− bc1)2 + σ2
)
It is obvious that pˆii,x=0 has a null for σ
2 = −(A − bc1)2, no matter what
strategies βi, βj the firms play. Therefore, without forward trading, pˆi
d, pˆic and pˆin
have a common point of intersection in the plane spanning across pˆii and σ
2. So
the intercept theorem applies and the fraction
(
pˆid − pˆic) / (pˆid − pˆin) is constant
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with respect to σ2 which is the statement in Proposition 2.a.
Proposition 2.b: Now, suppose the deviating firm has sold forward a quantity
xd > 0. By Lemma 3, its ex-post profits will be higher than those without forward
contracting. The critical discount factor will also be higher. But the derivative
of profits with respect to σ2 is unchanged (see Eq. 10, the multiplyer of σ2 does
not depend on xi or αi). Therefore, the line depicting the expected profits of
deviation pˆid over σ2 is shifted upwards as shown in Figure 3 by a line through
point E. The lines for collusive and one-shot Nash profits keep their intersection at
σ2 = −(A− bc1)2, but – due to the ordering of derivatives – the expected profits of
deviation pˆid intersect the punishment profits pˆin at some level of σ2 which is larger
(less negative) compared to the intersection of pˆid with collusive profits pˆic. Now,
with distinct points of intersections, the one for deviation and collusive profits
being more negative than the one for deviation and punishment profits, we know
that pˆid − pˆin increases in greater proportion with σ2 than does pˆid − pˆic for any
σ2 ≥ 0. This implies that the critical discount factor δ now decreases with σ2.
(xd, xn) such that δ > δ0 ⇔ dδ
dσ2
< 0
Conversely, consider the case when there are no forward sales during collusion,
but the firms expect positive forward sales in the punishment phase: xd = 0 and
xn > 0. By Lemma 1, the profits of Nash-reversion pi
n are lower compared to the
situation without forwards. The corresponding line in Figure 3 shifts downwards.
A reverse argument to the one before applies. Now, pˆid− pˆic will increase in greater
proportion with σ2 compared to pˆid − pˆin.
(xd, xn) such that δ < δ0 ⇔ dδ
dσ2
> 0
So it is evident, that there are infinitely many combinations of xd and xn which
shift deviation profits upwards and punishment profits downwards such that the
three lines still intersect at a common point (see Corollary 1). This common point
of intersection moves along the unaffected line of collusive profits towards more
negative values of σ2. Again from the basic proportionality theorem, we know that
for a given positive level of σ2, a shift of pˆid upwards and pˆin downwards such that all
three lines still intersect in a common point will keep the ratio (pˆid− pˆic)/(pˆid− pˆin)
constant. By simply taking xi = xj = 0 we are back to the case without forward
contracts as in Proposition 2.a. Therefore,
(xd, xn) such that δ = δ0 ⇔ dδ
dσ2
= 0.
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